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Abstract
A considerable body of research has extolled the virtues of establishing rapport in negotiations. Negotiators
who are high in rapport tend to be more likely to reach an agreement and more satisfied with the outcome.
Although rapport generally has been found to have positive effects in standard negotiation settings, we
investigate the effects of rapport in impasse settings, where conflict between negotiators' core needs means
that a successful deal can only be reached when one or both parties acts unethically or “misbehaves,” for
example, by lying to the negotiation partner. In a series of three experiments, we find that negotiators who
have a high level of rapport are more likely to behave unethically than are negotiators who have a low level of
rapport. We find this effect holds both when high rapport results from the way in which negotiations are
conducted (face-to-face versus computer mediated) and also when rapport is established through a brief
rapport-building exercise before negotiations begin. Finally, we find that the negative effects (unethical
behavior)—but not the positive effects (satisfaction with the negotiation, trust, and willingness to work in the
future with the negotiation partner)—of high rapport are reduced when negotiators are given a simple
reminder before negotiations begin that one's actions can have long-term repercussions for one's reputation.
Taken together, this research supports the idea that, despite its several advantages, in certain situations rapport
has a dark side, of which negotiators must be wary.
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THE DARK SIDE OF RAPPORT: 
AGENT MISBEHAVIOR FACE-TO-FACE AND ONLINE  
 
ABSTRACT 
A considerable body of research has extolled the virtues of establishing rapport in negotiations. 
Negotiators who are high in rapport tend to be more likely to reach an agreement and more satisfied with 
the outcome. Although rapport generally has been found to have positive effects in standard negotiation 
settings, we investigate the effects of rapport in impasse settings, where conflict between negotiators’ core 
needs means that a successful deal can only be reached when one or both parties acts unethically or 
“misbehaves,” for example, by lying to the negotiation partner. In a series of three experiments, we find 
that negotiators who have a high level of rapport are more likely to behave unethically than negotiators 
who have a low level of rapport. We find this effect holds both when high rapport results from the way in 
which negotiations are conducted (face-to-face vs. computer mediated) and also when rapport was 
established through a brief rapport-building exercise before negotiations began. Finally, we find that the 
negative effects (unethical behavior)—but not the positive effects (satisfaction with the negotiation, trust, 
and willingness to work in the future with the negotiation partner)—of high rapport are reduced when 
negotiators are given a simple reminder before negotiations begin that one’s actions can have long-term 
repercussions for one’s reputation. Taken together, this research supports the idea that, despite its several 
advantages, in certain situations rapport has a dark side, of which negotiators must be wary. 
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In a negotiation process, the relationship among the negotiators is as important as the substance of the 
negotiation. 
   Fisher and Shapiro, 2005, p. 190 
One of the significant changes in the study of negotiations in recent decades has been a shift from 
viewing these interactions as largely adversarial, in which one party typically gains an advantage at the 
expense of the other, to more congenial affairs, in which both parties not only come to a place that is 
mutually acceptable, but that they do so happily. A key insight from this approach is that, when 
negotiating, there are advantages to building rapport with the person across the table. Rapport is generally 
thought to be critical to concluding a successful negotiation (Moore, Kurtzberg, and Thompson, 1999; 
Nadler, 2003). Changing the tone from adversarial to collegial allows the cultivation of positive emotions 
and the reduction of fear and suspicion. Negotiations that do not produce a successful outcome are often 
characterized by a sense of competing interests, lack of understanding of the partner’s point of view, and 
suspicion of the partner’s motives. If negotiating partners can establish rapport, they are more likely to 
trust each other and to be willing to cooperate to reach an outcome that is satisfactory to both. They are 
also less likely to have to resort to threats and ultimatums (Nadler, 2003). Once a sense of rapport is 
achieved, both parties are willing to entertain the point of view of the other and come to a mutual 
understanding. Further, negotiators who build rapport can gauge the emotional needs of their counterparts 
and set the emotional tone (Fisher and Shapiro, 2005).  
Although the general objective of a negotiation is to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome, there are 
some situations in which the underlying values of the negotiators are so divergent that a deal can only be 
concluded through the unethical behavior (e.g., deception) of one or both parties. How does rapport 
influence the propensity for misbehavior in these impasse negotiations? Previous research suggests that 
rapport and its correlates, such as empathy, positive affect and perspective-taking, would lead to fewer 
unethical acts in negotiations (Dutton, Worline, Frost, and Lilius, 2006; Fitness, 2000). In contrast to the 
conventional wisdom, we propose that rapport can actually increase unethical behavior in negotiations 
when misbehavior facilitates reaching an agreement. This has particular relevance to impasse negotiations 
or negotiations that occur in a negative bargaining zone, where differences cannot be successfully forged 
to create a deal that serves both parties. Our proposal would imply that in situations of impasse when 
negotiators should forego an agreement, those with a high level of rapport might instead make a deal, 
even if it incurs an ethical cost. 
In this article, we examine the intersection of negotiation theory, agency theory, ethics, and 
communication media. First, our work allows researchers interested in agent interactions to better see the 
dark side of rapport, when relational demands detract from the focus on client interests. Second, it 
contributes to research on ethics in organizations by situating ethical action within a demanding 
interpersonal context and examining the relational facilitators of actual (versus self-reported intentions or 
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simulated) misbehavior. Third, we examine the effects of rapport on negotiations in the context of 
communication settings (face-to-face and computer-mediated negotiations) that are of immediate interest 
to organization theorists, given the increased prevalence of computer-mediated negotiations of all types. 
We test the prediction that increased rapport can lead to increased ethical lapses in three 
experiments. Participants in our studies, including undergraduate business students, MBA students and 
executives taking a course in negotiations, engaged in dyadic negotiations in which they represented 
clients with divergent values. Across studies, we found that participants in high rapport situations were 
more likely to behave unethically than those in low rapport situations. Experiment 1 establishes the effect 
and shows evidence of the different components of rapport. Experiment 2 replicates the basic finding and 
provides additional evidence for the causal role of rapport and rules out an alternative account for the 
effect based on cognitive load. Specifically, we manipulate rapport while holding the communication 
mode and sequence constant and find causal evidence of the role of rapport in encouraging misbehavior.   
Finally, in Experiment 3, we explore potential moderators of the influence of rapport on misbehavior and 
demonstrate how to retain the benefits of rapport such as trust, satisfaction, and willingness to work 
together again in the future, while removing its dark side effects (i.e., misbehavior). 
  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Rapport and Negotiations 
Colloquially, rapport describes a relationship characterized by a high degree of sympathy, accord and 
cooperation. More rigorously, Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal (1990) decompose rapport into three factors. 
The first is positivity or positive affect, an umbrella term that covers a variety of more discrete emotions 
along with a general positive feeling (Barsade and Gibson, 2007). Positive affect itself is linked to a wide 
range of outcomes in organizations, such as increasing work performance, creativity, teamwork, and 
negotiation agreement (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, and Staw, 2005; Barsade and Gibson, 2007; 
Kopelman, Rosette and Thompson, 2006; Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade, 2008). The second component of 
rapport is mutual attentiveness, which involves the focus of attention on the interaction partner and 
involvement with the partner. The third component of rapport is coordination, or being “in sync,” which 
refers to a sense of balance or harmony in the relationship. Equilibrium is achieved through the regularity 
and predictability of the other’s responses.  
Rapport is fundamental to communication (Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal, 1990), and foundational to 
the development of trust (Ross and Wieland, 1996), respect (Beach, Roter, Wang, Duggan, and Cooper, 
2006), and cooperation (Drolet and Morris, 2000; Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, and Thompson 2002). 
Given its importance to all forms of interpersonal communication, it is perhaps not surprising that rapport 
is also thought to facilitate successful negotiations (Fisher and Shapiro, 2005). Indeed, a lack of rapport 
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has been shown to lead to failures in interactions (Bruner and Spekman, 1998; Thompson and Nadler, 
2002; Planken, 2005).  
Rapport is built not just by what negotiation partners say, but also how they say it—and even by 
what is not said at all. Eye contact, tone of voice, posture, and facial expression add to the richness of the 
content of what is actually being said and enable agents to gauge more accurately the mutual attention, 
positivity, and coordination that comprise rapport (Bagozzi, Dholakia, and Pearo, 2007; Ekman, 1993; 
Spencer-Oatey, 2000; Sorce, Emde, Campos, and Klinnert, 1985; Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal, 1990). 
The importance of nonverbal cues is illustrated dramatically in research demonstrating that the level of 
rapport in an interaction can be judged reliably without even hearing the conversation. Observing facial 
expressions and body language as two people hold a conversation (without knowing what they are saying) 
can provide an assessment of rapport consistent with self-reports by the conversing individuals (Bernieri, 
Davis, Rosenthal, and Knee, 1994).  
Because of the importance of nonverbal communications in establishing rapport, different modes of 
negotiation could be expected to result in different levels of rapport. In particular, face-to-face 
negotiations facilitate rapport to a greater extent than negotiations conducted in a computer-mediated, 
online environment. Research to date has shown that the capacity for rapport and relational development 
declines when interactions are mediated by technology. This decline is due to a reduced ability to discern 
verbal and non-verbal cues important in understanding affective phenomena (Drolet and Morris, 2000; 
Gittel, 2001, 2003; Moore, Kurtzberg and Thompson, 1999; Thompson and Nadler, 2002). Consistent 
with this view, electronic media have been found to lead to a sense of depersonalization (Straus and 
McGrath,1994), which can impede the development of rapport. 
 
Rapport and Unethical Behavior in Negotiations 
There are various ways that negotiation partners can compromise themselves ethically, but for the 
purposes of this research, we will focus on two broad types of misbehavior: misbehavior toward the 
negotiation partner and misbehavior toward the client. We propose that increased rapport can cause an 
increase in both types. We further propose that although there is a similar behavioral outcome—increased 
unethical behavior—there are different reasons for rapport to influence each type of misbehavior. 
Misbehavior toward negotiation partner. Misbehavior directed toward the negotiation partner can 
range from dissembling, overpromising or omitting important information to outright deception and lying. 
The conventional view is that increased rapport, such as that facilitated through face-to-face 
communication leads to a higher incidence of ethical behavior (Naquin and Paulson, 2003). Valley, Moag 
and Bazerman (1998) found that individuals negotiating face-to-face are more likely to tell the truth than 
those negotiating either by telephone or in writing, in part because people believe that it is more costly to 
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the relationship to lie face-to-face. Face-to-face encounters seem to prime social norms of honesty and a 
positive relational atmosphere (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley, 2000; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, 
Wyer, and Epstein, 1996; Naquin and Paulson, 2003).  
In contrast to the conventional view, we propose that in some circumstances rapport can lead to an 
increase in deceiving the negotiation partner. At the core of our argument is the notion that sometimes 
negotiating involves giving the negotiation partner bad news—information that is contrary to the partner’s 
preferences and could jeopardize coming to a successful deal. This negative information represents a 
psychological conflict for a negotiator who is trying to build or maintain a high level of rapport. Building 
rapport often involves seeking out areas of agreement, while sharing information that the partner does not 
like can result in conflict. Thus, we predict that when a negotiation involves core requirements that are in 
conflict, negotiators seeking to build or maintain rapport may be more likely to deceive their partners than 
to disappoint them with the truth. 
This prediction may be reconciled with the conventional view that rapport decreases lying by noting 
that previous research has primarily focused on negotiations within a positive bargaining zone; in other 
words, negotiations with a low likelihood of reaching an impasse (Hancock, Thom-Santelli and Ritchie, 
2004). Recognizing that long-term rapport is more likely to be fostered in truthful interactions, previous 
research has found that people in these low conflict negotiations are, in general, less likely to lie when 
they are motivated to build rapport. In those situations where core requirements are in conflict, however, 
rapport-building negotiators are faced with a no-win situation. If they truthfully present the negative 
information, they may induce conflict and negative affect in their partner—both rapport killers (Tickle-
Degnen and Rosenthal, 1990). On the other hand, they can deceive their partner, either through lying or 
through more palatable and ethically gray behaviors like dissembling or omitting key information. These 
actions may damage the long-term relationship, but until the deception is found out, rapport may be 
maintained. Thus, deception can be a rapport-building action in the short-term, meaning that when 
negotiators have conflicting core preferences, those in a high rapport setting may be more likely to 
deceive.  
Misbehavior against the client. A second type of misbehavior can occur in negotiations where the 
negotiator is not representing her own interests, but those of a client. In particular, agent-negotiators can 
choose to sacrifice some of the interests of their clients in the name of successfully closing a deal. If the 
first type of misbehavior is directed across the table toward the negotiation partner, the second type of 
misbehavior is directed toward the back room, to wit, toward the client. 
We propose that in settings where the core preferences of the client are in conflict with those of the 
negotiation partner, high rapport settings are also likely to result in an increase of this second type of 
misbehavior, compromising the client’s interests. The literature on agency theory primarily has 
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investigated the roles of contract design, performance evaluation, and goal congruence to prevent 
opportunistic behavior such as shirking and misrepresentation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sappington, 1991). We 
suggest that the motivation to maintain rapport can serve as a different type of incentive for negotiators. 
When an agent takes a stand and strictly enforces client directives that are likely to cause conflict and 
negative affect, she is engaging in behavior that can be expected to damage rapport with the negotiation 
partner. One way of resolving this dissonance is to compromise on the client’s demands, thereby reducing 
the points of conflict and facilitating rapport. 
 
THE EXPERIMENTAL SETTING: NEGOTIATION IMPASSE  
All three experiments reported in this article used the Bullard Houses case (Karp, Gold, and Tan 
2006), a widely used ethics case developed by Northwestern University’s Dispute Resolution Research 
Center in the Kellogg School of Management. The case involves interactions between one buyer agent 
and one seller agent negotiating over a piece of prime real estate. This case was selected for these 
experiments because it leads to a negotiation impasse in which it is easy to misbehave in more than one 
way. Its usage across the three experiments contributes to comparability across varying manipulations and 
populations. 
Participants were assigned to dyads, with each member of the pair assigned to either the role of the 
buyer agent or the seller agent. The Bullard Houses case consists of two pages of general information read 
by everyone and an additional two pages of role-specific information, read only by the participant in each 
role. The seller firm owns a group of historic row houses and wants to sell the property, with the caveat 
that it be developed for residential use only; the seller is adamantly against the use of the property for 
commercial purposes. The role-specific instructions to the sellers outline three alternative buyers who had 
already made attractive offers, and although the sellers were motivated to dispose of the houses quickly, it 
was more important that the property be used in a way consistent with seller’s wishes. This makes it 
imperative that the seller’s agent accurately understand how the buyer will use the property.  
The buyer firm is a major hotel corporation that wants to develop the property into a luxury hotel. 
The buyer’s instructions indicate that in order for the purchase to be viable, the buyer would have to 
incent the local government to overturn precedent and allow the zoning to be changed to commercial. If 
word got out about the client’s identity and intentions, this would complicate the rezoning process. It 
would also vastly increase the price of this site as well as the buyer’s alternative options. In other words, 
there were few alternative options for their next commercial site.  
In sum, the seller’s agent is required to know how the buyer will use the property, while the buyer’s 
agent is directed not to reveal the use of the land or the buyer’s identity in order to protect the firm’s goals 
and interests. In this way, the case is intentionally constructed so as to create an impasse based on 
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conflicting core priorities between buyer and seller agents. Furthermore, the case creates an asymmetric 
pressure to misbehave between participants in the two roles. Specifically, although both buyer and seller 
agents are likely to feel some pressure to compromise the interests of their clients in order to facilitate 
closing a deal, the buyer’s agent is likely to face a much greater temptation to deceive than the seller’s 
agent. After all, the buyer’s agent is explicitly given the instruction not to reveal the very information the 
seller will find key to making a good decision. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The goal of the first experiment was to investigate the influence of rapport on unethical behavior in 
negotiations with a high degree of conflict. This experiment investigates both forms of misbehavior—
toward the negotiation partner (lying, overpromising) and toward the client (compromising the clients’ 
interests)—using mode of communication (face to face vs. computer mediated) as the independent 
variable. 
Method  
Fifty-four executive MBA students in a negotiations class participated in the Bullard Houses 
negotiation as part of an in-class exercise. On average, the participants were 38 years old with 13.1 years 
of work experience (4.5 to 25; s.d. = 5.5), 2.3 years of sales experience (0 to 20; s.d. = 4.0), and 3.8 years 
of experience dealing with suppliers (0 to 18; s.d. = 4.7). Seventy four percent of the participants were 
male. A variety of cultures was represented; 53% were from a western culture (North America, Europe, 
Australia), 40% were from an eastern culture (Asia, India), with the remaining participants from a Latin 
American culture. No significant differences among these demographic characteristics were found across 
the experimental conditions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to 27 buyer-seller dyads. Each dyad was then randomly 
assigned to one of two rapport conditions. Rapport was manipulated via the mode in which participants 
communicated. The 14 dyads in the high rapport condition conducted their negotiations face to face, 
seated across from each other and isolated from other dyads. Participants in the high rapport condition 
were not primed or instructed to build rapport; they simply completed a negotiation in a typical face to 
face manner. The remaining 13 dyads in the low rapport condition conducted a computer-mediated 
negotiation over an instant messaging program. In the low rapport condition, buyers were seated in a 
separate room from sellers and both agents used desktop computers for their interactions. The interactions 
were captured via computer or audiotape, and the resulting transcripts allowed analysis of the agents’ 
behavior and affective verbal expressions as well as the outcomes of their interaction. Participants had a 
total of one hour to read the case and conduct the negotiation.  
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Following the interaction, participants completed questionnaires measuring their evaluations of the 
interaction, their negotiation partner, and future intentions. This questionnaire included a seven-item scale 
measuring rapport adapted from Puccinelli and Tickle-Degnen (2004) and Drolet and Morris (2000). 
Consistent with their approach, our measure includes one item each of mutual attention (I felt aware of 
and interested in the agent), positivity (I liked and felt warm toward the agent) and five items of 
coordination (e.g., I felt like the agent and I were “on the same wavelength;” I felt a comfortable rhythm 
with and felt coordinated with the agent). All items were rated on a scale anchored on 1 = strongly 
disagree and 7 = strongly agree. The entire scale is listed in the Web Appendix. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. The experiment included several measures of the success of the rapport 
manipulation. The first manipulation check consisted of the self-reported rapport scale embedded in the 
after-negotiation questionnaire. All seven items loaded on a single factor with an average factor loading 
of .84 (.69 to .94; s.d. = .08) and a Cronbach’s alpha of .93. The results indicate that the manipulation was 
successful, such that participants who conducted their negotiations face to face scored significantly higher 
on the rapport scale (M = 5.41, s.d. 1.04) than participants who conducted their negotiations online (M = 
3.77, s.d. 1.24, F(1,52) = 27.7, p < .001). 
As a second measure of rapport, we developed a composite scale of accommodating behavior made 
up of the following four items: I tried to soothe the person’s feelings; I tried not to hurt the person’s 
feelings; If this rep’s position seemed very important to them, I tried to meet their wishes; In approaching 
negotiations, I tried to be considerate of this person’s wishes. This measure serves as a self-reported 
indicator of behaviors associated with the mutual attention and coordination aspects of rapport. The 
results revealed that participants in the high rapport condition reported a marginally significant increase in 
accommodating behavior compared to participants in the low rapport condition (5.0 vs. 4.2; t = 1.7, p < 
.10). 
Finally, we coded the transcripts of the negotiation for words associated with positive and negative 
affect (Larsen and Diener, 1992; Russell, 1980; Watson and Tellegen, 1985). According to the three part 
model of rapport we are using, maintaining positive affect is one important part of building rapport—and 
the one that is most likely to be revealed in transcripts of the negotiations. A strict count of emotion 
words is a common content analysis technique (Krippendorf, 1980; Carley, 1993), and represents a 
conservative test: felt emotions are likely to be undercounted, as emotion is often conveyed in nonverbal 
forms (Fridja, 1988; Reissman, 1993). However, this approach is useful because it does not rely on any 
form of interpretive analysis or participant self-reports.  
A meta-analysis of emotion words used in past research indicates that there are 71 words that reflect 
various forms of affect (Remington, Fabrigar and Visser, 2000). We found 60 of these 71 words, and 
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counted all appearances of each word, including common variants such as plural or past tense forms. 
Words were examined in context, making sure to eliminate words that were not used to convey emotion 
(e.g., “we’re still talking” vs. “I’m feeling still and settled”). A listing of these words and their frequencies 
across the rapport condition can be found in the Web Appendix. We examined positive and negative 
affect across the conditions  by subtracting the negative affect word count from the positive word count 
for each participant. A higher index score indicates a higher net positive affect expressed during the 
negotiation. A one-way ANOVA indicates there was more positive affect expressed in the high rapport, 
face to face condition (M = 5.38) than in the low rapport, online condition (M = 3.04; F(1,52) = 6.63, p < 
.01). 
Unethical behavior. We predicted that in this high conflict setting, misbehavior is likely to be a 
function of rapport, such that higher levels of rapport would lead to higher levels of misbehavior. We 
tested this hypothesis in several ways. 
One indicator of misbehavior is simply the proportion of dyads that successfully brokered a deal. 
The Bullard Houses case is intentionally set up such that the buyers and sellers have insurmountable 
differences concerning the disposition and use of the property. If the sellers knew the buyers’ true 
intentions, they would not sell. Thus, a successful resolution is an indication that either the buyer was less 
than truthful, or the buyer’s agent or the seller’s agent compromised the desires of the client, or both. The 
results were consistent with our predictions. When participants negotiated face to face (high rapport 
condition), 84.6% of dyads reached a deal, indicating a high level of misbehavior. When participants 
negotiated via instant messaging (low rapport condition), the proportion of successful deals dropped to 
42.9%, with the rest ending at an impasse. A logistic regression revealed that, as predicted, the rapport 
condition (high vs. low) was a significant predictor of the likelihood of reaching a deal (Χ2(1) = 6.85, p < 
.01) 
As a second indicator of misbehavior, we examined the transcripts of the negotiations for evidence 
of the two types of ethical transgressions most of interest to us: deceiving the negotiating partner (through 
misleading statements, overpromising, or outright lying) and compromising the client (by violating the 
client’s explicit instructions). Three research assistants, blind to the experimental condition coded the 
transcripts for instances of misbehavior. Agreement among the coders was quite high (r = .65) and 
disagreements were resolved through discussion. The coding for misbehavior was distinct from, and 
conducted separately from, the affect count that served as a manipulation check. Across all participants, 
there were 287 total instances of misbehavior of some form. Some examples of each type of misbehavior, 
pulled from the transcripts, are given in the Web Appendix. 
Consistent with the results of the negotiation outcome measure, participants who conducted their 
negotiations face-to-face were more likely to misbehave, as evidenced by the language used in the 
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transcripts, than participants whose negotiations were computer mediated (see Table 1). An ANOVA 
predicting total misbehavior as a function of rapport (high vs. low), role (seller vs. buyer) and the 
interaction revealed a significant effect of rapport (F(1,50) = 25.97, p < .001). Role was also a significant 
predictor of misbehavior, with buyers more likely to misbehave than sellers (F(1,50) = 4.68, p < .05). 
Consistent with our prediction, there was no significant interaction between rapport and role (p > .80), 
suggesting that the influence of rapport on misbehavior was consistent across roles.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here. 
--------------------------------------------- 
We next examined each type of misbehavior. Recall that we had predicted not just more ethical 
lapses in the aggregate, but both more deception toward the negotiating partner as well as more 
compromising of clients’ interests. Both of these predictions were supported by the data. Deceiving the 
negotiation partner (including misleading statements, overpromising and lying) was significantly more 
likely among buyers than sellers—not surprising, given the structure of the case (F(1,50) = 14.80, p < 
.001). More germane to the proposed hypothesis, deception was greater among participants in the high 
rapport condition than among those in the low rapport condition (F(1,50) = 8.21, p < .01). The interaction 
between rapport and role was not significant (p > .70). Finally, in addition to being more likely to deceive 
their negotiation partners, participants in the high rapport condition were also more likely to compromise 
their client’s interests than participants in the low rapport condition (F(1,50) = 19.83, p < .001). There 
was no difference in compromising the client based on buyer and seller roles (p > .35) and the interaction 
between rapport and role was not significant (p > .95). 
We have argued that negotiators in high-conflict negotiations may misbehave as a way of 
maintaining a high level of rapport with their partners. This implies that misbehavior is likely to be 
deliberate and strategic and that participants will be aware of the ethically questionable nature of their 
behavior. Thus, as a third indicator of misbehavior, we asked participants in the post-negotiation 
questionnaire to self-report ethical violations during the negotiation. 
The results reveal that participants with high rapport considered their own actions to be more 
ethically questionable than did participants with low rapport. Specifically, in the high rapport condition, 
in which negotiations were conducted face to face, buyers were more likely to admit to having behaved 
unethically (i.e., primarily to have lied, misled, or evaded the seller’s queries) than participants in the low 
rapport condition, in which negotiations were conducted online (46.2% vs. 25.0%). This pattern was 
reversed for participants denying ethical lapses: 23.1% of participants in the high rapport condition 
answered no, they did not behave in an ethically questionable way, compared to 46.4% in the low rapport 
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condition. A logistic regression revealed this interaction to be significant (Χ2(1) = 4.64, p < .05). The Web 
Appendix reveals a sample of the self-reported ethical violations.  
Consequences of rapport. Past research suggests that rapport is fundamental to the development of 
trust, respect, and cooperation. In our context, this would suggest that participants would experience some 
of the downstream consequences of rapport, despite the concurrent high levels of misbehavior. As an 
example, there is a known relationship between rapport and satisfaction with an interaction, including 
settings such as physician-patient relationships (Koss and Rosenthal, 1997) and firm-customer 
interactions (Gremier and Gwinner, 2000). Within the marketing literature, research in salesforce 
management has shown that emotions are related to future intentions for achievement (Brown, Cron, and 
Slocum, 1997) as well as the behaviors that are directed toward achievement (Brown et al., 1997; 
Verbeke and Bagozzi, 2000, 2002).  
We examined three widely studied outcomes of relational exchange: satisfaction with the 
negotiation, trust of the negotiation partner, and willingness to work with the negotiation partner in future 
exchanges—to see whether misbehavior mitigated the advantages of rapport in negotiations. The results 
are consistent with our account, in that the correlates of rapport did not appear to be negatively affected 
by the misbehavior of the participants in the negotiation. Specifically, we found that satisfaction (5.7 vs. 
4.8; t = 3.55, p < .001), trust (5.3 vs. 3.9; t = 3.55, p < .001), and willingness to work with the partner 
again (5.7 vs. 4.7; t = 1.72, p < .09) were all higher for participants in the high rapport condition. In short, 
the condition with the highest level of misbehavior—the high rapport condition where participants 
negotiated face to face—was also the condition with the most positive indicators of the downstream 
consequences of rapport. 
Control measures. In order to make sure any differences we found could not be attributed to a 
difference in the time spent on negotiations, we recorded the total negotiation time. All participants 
completed their interactions during the allotted time, and the amount of time to completion did not differ 
across condition (face-to-face: 49.5 minutes vs. online: 47.2 minutes; t < 1).  
Could knowing that their conversations were being recorded for research purposes have affected the 
agents’ negotiations differently in the two rapport conditions? In the questionnaire, we asked participants 
to indicate their level of agreement with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree): I was comfortable having this negotiation recorded; It made me nervous to know that our 
negotiation was being recorded. The difference in the mean value of these statements across rapport 
conditions was not significant (ts < 1).  
Another possible explanation for at least some of the results of Experiment 1 is that participants in 
the online condition simply cared less about engaging with their negotiation partners. If participants 
lacked the motivation to engage, it may be a sign of a general lack of motivation to negotiate or take the 
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task seriously. However, an analysis of the negotiation transcripts showed that online conversations 
contained more expressions of formal politeness, such as, “pleasure to meet you,” “please,” and “thank 
you” than did the face-to-face negotiations (M = 4.8 vs. 1.1, F = 15.20, p < .001)1
Finally, we examined a number of alternative factors across the conditions that could potentially 
account for the reported differences in misbehavior, including the familiarity between participants, 
negotiating effort, the need to strike a deal, the degree to which the task was taken seriously, and the 
degree to which the participants were motivated to act on their clients’ behalf. Analysis revealed no 
differences across the rapport condition (all ts < 1).  
. This indicates that 
online negotiators used a more formal style of conversation, suggesting that they were engaged in the task 
and seeking to maintain a basic level of politeness to facilitate task accomplishment, but not the more 
emotionally rich communication that facilitates rapport. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provides support for our central hypothesis that under impasse conditions, high levels 
of rapport actually lead to higher levels of unethical behavior than low levels of rapport. We found that 
high rapport led to increases in two different types of misbehavior: both misleading one’s negotiation 
partner and also betraying the interests of one’s principal. 
This experiment used multiple, convergent measures of all the constructs of interest. Rapport was 
measured using a self-reported composite of feeling of rapport (e.g., feeling “in sync”), a measure of 
behaviors associated with rapport (e.g., being accommodating), a measure of the affective language used 
during the negotiations, and measures of the downstream correlates of rapport (e.g., willingness to work 
with the partner again). All of these measures confirmed that participants negotiating face-to-face 
experienced higher levels of rapport than participants negotiating online. 
We also used multiple, convergent measures of misbehavior. Evidence of misbehavior was found in 
the proportion of deals reached, in dishonest statements recorded in transcripts of the negotiations, and in 
self-reports of misbehavior. It is worth noting that lying and other forms of unethical behavior are 
pervasive throughout, and are to some degree, encouraged by the setting in the case. However, the 
generally high motivation to misbehave cannot explain the observed differences in misbehavior across the 
conditions. All measures confirmed that those in the high rapport, face-to-face condition behaved less 
ethically than those in the low rapport condition and, in fact, they did so knowingly. Finally, the 
experiment included a number of control measures designed to help rule out possible alternative 
explanations. 
                                                 
1 This result includes controls for the role of the participant and the number of words used in the interaction, neither 
of which reach statistical significance. 
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In this experiment, rapport was manipulated through the mode of communication, such that those 
conducting negotiations face-to-face had a higher level of rapport than people conducting negotiations 
online, via a computer-mediated instant messaging program. Although the results were consistent with 
our predictions, it is important to note that face-to-face negotiations differ from online negotiations in a 
number of ways in addition to rapport. One potentially relevant difference is in the amount of cognitive 
resources required to conduct face-to-face negotiations relative to online negotiations. When interacting 
face-to-face, negotiators must manage verbal, visual, and affective cues that could make the “relational 
work” of the interaction demanding (Es, French, and Stellmaszek, 2004). This is consistent with research 
in psychology, which finds that individuals are motivated to maintain positive affect (Isen, 1987) and that 
in face-to-face interactions people experience greater pressure to react instantaneously and manage 
emotions (Es, French, and Stellmaszek, 2004). Although helpful, sending and receiving non-verbal cues 
requires extra effort that may not be required in strictly verbal online negotiations. If behaving ethically 
requires more cognitive resources than misbehaving, then the increased misbehavior found in Experiment 
1 could reasonably be attributed to differences in cognitive load, instead of differences in rapport. In other 
words if individuals use their cognitive resources to build rapport, they have fewer resources left to focus 
on behaving ethically. This alternative explanation is consistent with depletion theory, which has shown 
that when people have expended cognitive resources toward a task (e.g., processing nonverbal cues), they 
have fewer resources left to devote to self-regulatory tasks, such as behaving ethically (Baumeister and 
Heatherton, 1996).  
A related concern that arises from Experiment 1 might be whether rapport is driving the misbehavior 
or whether it is the joint task of developing rapport in addition to managing the negotiation that facilitates 
misbehavior. Experiment 2 was designed to address these concerns, by isolating the development of 
rapport from the negotiation task and by contrasting online negotiations in the treatment group with a 
control group that also negotiates online. 
EXPERIMENT 2  
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to rule out alternative explanations for the misbehavior effects 
reported in Experiment 1 rooted in the differences between face-to-face and online negotiations and to 
establish the causal order of rapport as driving the negotiation outcome, versus being simultaneously 
developed. In the previous experiment, the rapport manipulation (mode of communication) was arguably 
confounded with the cognitive load required to conduct the negotiation. In this experiment, we manipulate 
rapport independently of the mode and sequence of communication in which the negotiations were 
conducted. Specifically, in Experiment 2, everyone conducted the negotiations online, via instant 




Participants were 82 undergraduate business students. Fifty one percent of the participants were male 
and their average age was 22 years old. Participants were randomly assigned to a rapport condition (high 
vs. low) and also to a role as either a buyer’s agent or a seller’s agent in the Bullard Houses negotiation 
simulation. The experiment was conducted in a networked computer lab. Negotiating dyads were seated 
on opposite sides of the lab, with their backs to each other, limiting any opportunity for nonverbal 
communication. Participants were instructed to conduct their negotiations only through instant messaging. 
In the low rapport condition, 40 participants (20 dyads) simply read the case and began the 
negotiation, just like participants in the low rapport condition in Experiment 1. In the high rapport 
condition, after reading the case, but before beginning the negotiation, each of the 21 dyads participated 
in a rapport-building exercise. Participants were instructed to introduce themselves to each other, sharing 
their names, hometowns and concentration (major). Based on a manipulation previously used by Drolet 
and Morris (2000) and Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson and Morris (1999), participants were then asked to 
take five minutes to discuss some of the positive experiences they have had at school. After the rapport 
building exercise, participants were seated in the lab with their backs to each other, just like participants 
in the low rapport condition. Thus, this manipulation holds the negotiation experience constant across 
conditions (on-line media) but allows participants to establish rapport before the negotiation for those in 
the high rapport condition. After the rapport building exercise, but before the negotiation, participants 
were given a brief questionnaire asking about their current state of mind. 
Following the negotiation, participants completed a questionnaire measuring their perceived rapport 
with their negotiation partner. They were also asked to evaluate their own misbehavior by indicating their 
agreement with the statement, “I made false statements to conceal my true purposes,” on a seven-point 
scale. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. We used the same composite rapport measure used in the post-negotiation 
questionnaire in Experiment 1. The results reveal that participants in the high rapport condition reported 
experiencing a higher level of rapport than participants in the low rapport condition (4.8 vs. 4.2; t = -2.59, 
p < .05). 
In addition, in order to discretely establish that participants in the high rapport condition were 
motivated to establish rapport, we asked them about their state of mind after the rapport building exercise, 
but before starting negotiations. Tickle-Dengen and Rosenthal (1990) propose that in early interactions, 
individuals primarily focus on attention and positivity in the development of rapport relative to the third 
dimension, coordination.  Attention and positivity in initial interactions will manifest itself in 
“abbreviated forms” (Mehrabian, 1971) of non-verbal behavior such as trunk lean, body orientation 
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toward each other, and the direction of one’s gaze.  This speaks to basic approach-and-avoidance forces 
and the evaluative demands on the individuals.  Rapport depends heavily on both individuals exhibiting 
and perceiving positive cues toward the other such that they are able to create a shared behavioral style 
and adopt each other’s perspective.  To this end, participants were asked to indicate how open and 
indifferent they felt immediately before beginning the negotiation. We anticipated that participants who 
had participated in the rapport building exercise would feel more open and less indifferent going into the 
negotiation. Consistent with this view, we found that participants in the high rapport condition reported 
feeling more open (5.4 vs. 4.8; t = 2.57; p < .01) and less indifferent (2.9 vs. 3.5; t = 2.11; p < .05) than 
participants in the low rapport condition, who did not talk face-to-face with their partners before 
beginning negotiations. This manipulation check suggests that rapport was established before negotiations 
began. 
Unethical behavior. As an initial measure of misbehavior, we looked at the proportion of participants 
who reached a deal in the case. Results reveal that 79.5% of participants in the low rapport condition 
reached a deal, compared with 87.8% in the high rapport condition. Although the difference was in the 
predicted direction, it did not reach significance (Χ2(1) = 1.02, ns). Although we know that rapport 
differed across the conditions, we considered the possibility that the rapport-building manipulation might 
not have been equally effective for all participants in the high rapport condition. As a more conservative 
test of our hypothesis, we therefore eliminated those individuals whose reported rapport score was one 
standard deviation below the mean level of rapport, leaving 30 of the original 42 participants in the high 
rapport condition. We then compared the proportion of deals made among those remaining in the high 
rapport condition to the proportion of deals made in the control condition. This analysis indicates that 
97.0% of the participants in the high rapport condition reached a deal, versus 79.5% in the low rapport 
condition, a difference that is significant (Χ2(1) = 4.41, p < .05). 
As a second measure of misbehavior, participants were also asked to evaluate the truthfulness of 
their statements during the negotiation. This subjective self-evaluation revealed that, consistent with our 
predictions, participants in the high rapport condition were more likely to agree that they had made false 
statements in order to conceal their true purpose (3.5 vs. 2.6; t = -2.12, p < .05). 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicates the main finding from Experiment 1—that high rapport can increase 
misbehavior—using a different manipulation of rapport, one that effectively rules out cognitive load as an 
explanation. It is important to note that this experiment does not prove that cognitive load plays no part in 
misbehavior. We suspect that it does. However, cognitive load cannot explain the differences in 





The previous experiments paint a relatively dark view of rapport, suggesting that it will facilitate 
unethical behavior in impasse, and that agents will knowingly and strategically misbehave to maintain 
rapport. Given the many benefits of rapport in negotiations, one might naturally ask whether the negative 
effects we’ve identified can be overcome. Put another way, can negotiators receive the benefits of high 
rapport, such as more trust, cooperation and positive emotions, without suffering the negative 
consequences of higher incidence of ethical lapse? Experiment 3 was designed to answer this question. 
Specifically, we tested whether a subtle reminder immediately before a negotiation of the long-term 
consequences of unethical behavior on one’s reputation would decrease the incidence of misbehavior 
among negotiators with high rapport. 
Method  
Participants were 46 MBA students in a negotiations class with an average of five years of work and 
sales experience; 57% of the students were male and the average age was 28 years old. Thirty six percent 
of them were from an Asian, 43% from a Western, 10% from an African, and 7% from a Latin American 
culture. As with the previous experiments, all participants were randomly assigned to the role of a buyer’s 
agent or a seller’s agent in the Bullard Houses negotiation simulation. In this experiment all negotiations 
were conducted face to face. In other words, all participants were in a high rapport situation when 
negotiating. Before the negotiation began, all participants received some final instructions under the guise 
of making the negotiation task more realistic. Each dyad was randomly assigned to receive one of two 
types of final instructions (both members of the dyad received the same type of instructions). Participants 
in the compensation goal condition read the following passage:  
We would like this negotiation to be as real as possible. Because simulated classroom exercises differ 
from real-world settings in many ways, you may find yourself acting in ways that are not typical of how 
you would act in a real business setting. In order to avoid this, we wanted to remind you of some things that 
would be obvious if you really found yourself in this situation. 
Remember that although the focus of this exercise is the present negotiation, if this were real, [this 
negotiation might have long-term professional consequences. For many negotiators, compensation is tied to 
successfully reaching an agreement—for example, real estate agents are typically only paid when a deal has 
been closed. In addition, your ability to continue representing your current client and your ability to secure 
new clients will rely, at least in part, on your ability to successfully resolve negotiations.] To the extent that 
any of these concerns would influence your behavior in your profession, treat them as real concerns in this 
simulated negotiation.  
Please treat this negotiation as if it were a real negotiation, with all the typical downstream 
consequences of a real negotiation. 
Participants in the reputation goal condition read the same passage, but with the portion in brackets 
replaced with the following: 
…you would also need to live with the legal, social and professional consequences of any decisions 
you make during the negotiation. Your success in future negotiations, your continued employment with the 
client you represent, and your reputation in the local business community—including your ability to get 
other jobs—could all be affected by the decisions you make as a negotiator. 
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These two conditions are meant to emphasize one of the two conflicting goals that are likely to be 
present for all negotiators: reaching a successful deal and maintaining one’s reputation for behaving 
ethically. In the real world, both an ability to close deals and a reputation for behaving ethically are assets 
with long-term implications. This manipulation was simply meant to shift the relative importance of these 
two goals for participants. Importantly, these conditions are designed to increase the importance of one of 
these goals without making rapport any more or less important in the ensuing negotiation. 
Following the negotiation, participants completed a brief questionnaire about their experience. 
Within the questionnaire was a question measuring the motivation of participants during the negotiation: I 
wanted to be absolutely honest, even if it meant not striking a deal. Participants were asked the extent to 
which they agreed with that statement, with responses measured on a seven-point scale, anchored on 1 = 
strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. As a check of whether the reminder embedded in the instructions created 
different motivations in the two conditions, we examined participants’ responses to the question of how 
motivated they were to be honest. Consistent with our intentions, participants in the reputation goal 
condition were significantly more likely to report being motivated by a desire to be honest than by a 
desire to strike a deal (6.0 vs 5.0; t = -2.10, p < .05).  
Unethical behavior. Just as in the previous two experiments, our measure of misbehavior was the 
percentage of negotiating dyads that were able to close a deal. In the compensation goal condition, 75.0% 
of participant dyads successfully closed a deal, a percentage roughly in line with the results of the high-
rapport (face to face) condition in Experiment 1. When participants were given a gentle reminder of the 
possible consequences of misbehavior to their reputations, the proportion of deals dropped to 45.5% 
(Χ2(1) = 4.21, p < .05).  
Rapport and the effects of rapport. One question we sought to answer with this study was whether 
people in high-conflict negotiation settings could establish a high level of rapport but also overcome the 
negative consequences of high rapport (i.e., increased misbehavior). To this end, we measured rapport 
using the same composite measure used in Experiments 1 and 2. The results revealed no difference in 
self-reported rapport between the compensation goal and the reputation goal conditions (5.0 vs. 4.9; p > 
.70). We also examined the downstream consequences of rapport controlling for the deal outcome (i.e., 
whether or not participants reached a deal) and found no significant differences in terms of satisfaction 
with the negotiation (5.5 vs. 4.8; t = .87, p < .35), trust of the negotiation partner (4.9 vs. 4.6; t = .37, p < 




The results of Experiment 3 suggest that participants can reap the benefits of high rapport while 
avoiding the costs—if they are vigilant. We found that among negotiators with high rapport, a reminder to 
think about the long-term reputational consequences of misbehavior resulted in a higher ethical standard 
than a reminder to think about the pecuniary consequences of failing to come to a deal. In both cases, 
rapport remained high and there were no differences in the downstream correlates of rapport, such as trust 
and satisfaction. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this research, we contest the popular notion that rapport between negotiation partners is an 
unallayed good. Although we acknowledge that rapport offers many advantages, the research presented in 
this article suggests that when there is a high degree of conflict in the core values held by the negotiating 
partners, rapport has a dark side. In a series of experiments, we document that high levels of rapport lead 
to a higher incidence of misbehavior—both misleading negotiation partners and forsaking the interests of 
employers. One possible reason for this increase in misbehavior is the reluctance of negotiators who are 
trying to maintain rapport to deliver bad news, revealing the impasse. 
More practically, at the start of the negotiation, neither agent knows ex ante whether the negotiation 
will lie in a positive or negative bargaining zone. The prevailing wisdom is to develop rapport as a means 
of determining this. However, our findings caution that high rapport in situations of impasse may in fact, 
create a “slippery slope” for misbehavior. Thus, it appears that the social pressures that arise from rapport 
make it difficult for agents to make “better” or “rational” decisions – i.e., to walk away upholding their 
client’s desires without incurring negative ethical and economic consequences. This departs from 
conventional wisdom that face-to-face meetings are viewed as more appropriate for dealing with highly 
equivocal situations that involve multiple, conflicting interpretations (Daft and Lengel, 1986).  
We agree with the consensus view that it is often incumbent to maintain rapport and goodwill if 
negotiators are to be kept at the table. At the same time, however, the “table” is becoming more 
metaphorical. Agents are increasingly relying on virtual meetings – via computer conferencing, social 
media, instant messaging, online chat, and other computer mediated communication technologies – to 
manage these exchanges. Such technologies enable interactions and collaborations over wide geographic 
and cultural distances, but are also “reductionistic” in their ability to convey emotions, intentions, and 
other forms of non-verbal communication relative to face-to-face meetings. Our results would suggest 
that in situations of impasse, the inhibited ability to create rapport in computer mediated environments 




Collectively, we examine the interface at which negotiation theory, agency theory, ethics, and 
marketing meet in interactions between buyer-seller agents. The pattern of findings presented here is 
consistent with narrative theorists, who show that as individuals co-create narratives the inherent process 
of a story builds tension that requires a resolution (Bruner, 1986; Riessman, 1993; Ochs and Capps, 
2001); in this interaction there were no means of resolution. Since the dyads could not end their story 
together on a positive note without misbehaving, it appears that those who interacted face-to-face, and 
experienced the greatest pressure to co-create their stories while maintaining rapport, became more likely 
to misbehave as a means of relieving the tension that was building. This finding also accords with the 
classical experiments on compliance, in which people have difficulty refusing inappropriate face-to-face 
requests (Milgram, 1975). We propose that the urgent need to manage rapport may inhibit the agent’s 
focus on the client’s interests. 
Our findings contribute to research on ethics in organizations by situating ethical action within a 
demanding interpersonal context and examining the relational facilitators of actual (versus self-reported 
intentions or simulated) misbehavior. It also advances our understanding of the role of emotional 
phenomena such as rapport and ethical behavior. Cognitive neuroscience researchers have confirmed that 
both cognitive and emotional processes play critical roles in ethical decision-making (Greene, Nystrom, 
Engell, Darley, and Cohen, 2004; Greene and Haidt, 2002). Our research adds to this emerging 
perspective that individuals tend to have affective reactions to ethical issues, and that knowledge of affect 
will enhance understanding of unethical behavior.  
Our results also suggest that cognitive models of ethical interaction processes could be enhanced by 
accounting for rapport management. Most models of ethical behavior include characteristics of the 
individual decision-maker, such as moral judgment, but fail to acknowledge the important role of an 
individual’s affect or interpersonal demands for rapport. Further, these results suggest that affect as it 
transpires between individuals is an important element of ethical or unethical action. Further research 
could increase the robustness and predictive ability of these models. 
Managerial Implications 
The demonstration that reminders to act ethically can mitigate misbehavior is consistent with 
research in business ethics that has also shown the effectiveness of organizations that continuously cue 
ethics and reinforce the message that employees need to act ethically (and to eschew unethical behavior). 
Such reminders might also help agents stay focused on their client’s goals. It may well be that agents who 
reiterated their clients’ concerns via repeated questioning of their counterpart were less likely to come to a 
deal. Practically, this could suggest that active attempts to remain focused on their clients’ concerns and 
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wishes via repeated questioning, whether in face-to-face or online interactions, could help the agents stay 
on task and not get swept up by the effects of rapport.  
Our results also imply that managers need to be aware of the ways in which interpersonal 
interactions at work may influence unethical behavior. Previous work in business ethics has indicated that 
referent others will have an impact on ethical and unethical behavior (Treviño, 1986, Wortruba, 1990), 
with the assumption that pressures from referent others at work lead employees to succumb to temptation. 
Our results extend this thinking to propose that an attempt to maintain rapport can also lead to unethical 
behavior. These results have particular application to client or customer situations in which an 
individual’s interest in keeping the client “happy” may lead to cutting ethical corners. Firms need to 
realize that their policies and interaction practices should not emphasize retaining customers or clients “at 
any cost.” Similarly, corporate policies need to encourage employee dissent and provide avenues for 
employees to voice their opinions—potentially online or through other computer mediated means, where 
rapport management demands are lowered and it becomes easier to pose difficult questions or speak up 
about questionable practices. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 The research is not without limitations. The data, while imperfect, were painstakingly gathered 
from executive, graduate, and undergraduate populations and analyzed in an attempt to better understand 
the nature of rapport. Because of cost and time constraints, our approach was not conducive to large 
sample sizes. However, the significance of our results and their patterns across multiple indicators and 
various levels of analyses provide a measure of confidence and trustworthiness to our conclusions and 
discussion. More broadly, this research is meant to provide a starting point for future research on the 
interrelationships of rapport, misbehavior and technology. 
An important issue for future research would be to more generally explore additional reasons as to 
why people are knowingly unethical. Our results suggest that the need to “do business,” that is, to create 
rapport with the other agent and close the deal at any cost enables justification of their actions. Or maybe 
the unethical behavior – lying, misleading, overpromising, or compromising client wishes – is too 
innocuous to be considered “unethical.” Or as suggested by recent research in marketing, an individual’s 
self concept might keep her from viewing her actions as unethical (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008). In this 
context, negotiators could suffer from inattention to moral standards during a negotiation, allowing them 
to engage in objectively unethical behavior without damaging a self-view as an honest person. These 
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EXPERIMENT 1: INSTANCES OF MISBEHAVIOR INCREASE  













 Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer 
High rapport  













Low rapport  












NOTE.— A successful deal could only be reached if one or both parties engaged in unethical behavior, 
therefore, a deal being reached was one indicator of unethical behavior. Cell means report another 
measure: average instances of misbehavior per participant during the negotiation, based on a content 




WEB APPENDIX TO ACCOMPANY  
 
 
THE DARK SIDE OF RAPPORT:  
AGENT MISBEHAVIOR FACE-TO-FACE AND ONLINE 
 
  
QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS AND RELIABILITIES 
 
Rapport Correlation coefficient = .93 
I felt aware of and interested in the agent. 
I liked and felt warm toward the agent.  
I felt like the agent and I were “on the same wavelength.” 
I felt a comfortable rhythm with and felt coordinated with the agent. 
I felt rapport with the agent. 
I felt that the agent understood the feelings that I expressed. 
I felt that the agent shared my feelings of rapport. 
 
Satisfaction with Outcomes Correlation coefficient = .62 
I am satisfied with the outcome of the negotiation.  
I am satisfied with my party’s outcomes in this negotiation. 
 
Fairness of Our Outcome  Correlation coefficient = .61 
The outcome of the negotiation was fair.  
The outcome of the negotiation was reasonable to me.  
 
Willingness to Negotiate in the Future  Correlation coefficient = .77 
I would be willing to negotiate with this agent again in the future.  
I would be willing to work with this agent again in the future.  
 
Trust Alpha = .85 
Our promises to each other were reliable.  
We were very honest in dealing with each other.  
We trusted each other.  
We would go out of our way to help each other out.  
We considered each other’s interests when problems arose. 
  
AFFECT COUNTS, EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Below is a listing of the words (and their variations) and their associated frequencies in the data. 
 
 High Low 
 Rapport Rapport 
Affection/ate, Love 21 4 
Active 1 0 
Afraid, Fear/s 2 1 
Aggression, Aggressive 2 0 
Anger, Angry 3 0 
Anxiety, Anxious, Nervous, Worried, Tense, Tension 4 3 
Ashamed 2 0 
Astonished, Surprise/d/s 1 0 
Confident 2 3 
Content, At Ease 1 0 
Disappoint/ed, Discontent, Discouraged, Disgust/ed, Dissatisfied 1 0 
Distressed 2 1 
Excite/d, Elation, Elated, Energetic, Energized, 
Enjoy/ment/ed/ing, Enthusiastic, Excitement 10 0 
Glad 6 4 
Happy, Happiness 13 12 
Interest/ed/ing 109 69 
Uninterested, disinterested, not interested 8 1 
Pleased 1 0 
Sad/ness 0 1 
Satisfied 3 2 
Skeptic/ism 0 1 




EXAMPLES OF OBSERVED AGENT MISBEHAVIOR, EXPERIMENT 1  
MISBEHAVIOR TOWARD THE PARTNER 
This includes lies (statements that directly contradict the facts of the case), misleading statements (i.e., allow a 
misunderstanding to persist in the interactions, including incomplete responses to questions asked by the other 
agent) and overpromising (i.e., statements in which agents agree to something that they are not at liberty to commit 
to given the facts of the case, including agreeing to future actions that are highly unlikely given the case information. 
Includes any promise of future action that was unlikely to occur given the speakers case instructions.) 
 
Seller’s agent: Can you tell me the name of the public hotel company, I need to know that to justify the high 
tower building  
Buyer’s agent:  I do not have that information. 
 
 
Seller’s agent: Will these proposed renovations change the exterior of the property? 
Buyer’s agent: Sure, Um, I think when we talk about what is going to happen with the property, we need to 
preserve the historical look and feel of Bullard. 
 
 
Seller’s agent: Can you be more specific about your plan for the property? 
Buyers’ agent: Our plan is to refurbish the properties.  We have to refurbish them—they are crumbling. 
 
 
Seller’s agent: What about the structure of the property? 
Buyer’s agent: We are just going to restore it and make it better. 
  
 
Seller’s agent: Have you guys looked into what the use of the property would be? 




Sample statements from the Buyer agents:  
 
We plan to convert the property into a museum. 
 
I think, when I look at what I could develop, you know…luxury housing or, or you know, condos and the like 
on that property. 
 
Our offer, or our plans for the building would, I think, accomplish your goals.  They would allow for 
revitalization of the neighborhood for sure. 
 
My client would be willing to grant you approval on construction plans for a period of 12-24 months. 
 
Once you all take the offer, you and I will develop a planned strategy on what you want the building to be.   
 
If they [Bullard family members] absolutely require staying in the house, we can talk about designating some 
permanent housing on the lower floors. 
 
We will leave it to the Bullard family to come up with a luxury feel for it. 




Sample statements from the Seller agents: 
 
We are working with the mayor’s office to provide you with a tax incentive. 
 
Would it change your client’s perspective on the use of the property if I was able to offer them future income 




Statements in which the agents divulge information about their client’s intentions against their explicit wishes; their 
concerns and priorities were strictly stated in the case information.  Any time a speaker directly disobeyed one of the 
four specific instructions given to them by the client in the case briefing. 
 
Samples from the Buyer agents:  
I’m telling ya … we’re looking to revitalize the area by building an elegant hotel. 
My client is the Conrad Milton Corporation 
 
Let’s say, ah, 50%? 50%? Not bad. 50% residential I think, in the contract, if we can get it said 50% residential 
we can, we can sign the deal right here. 
 
I mean we're looking to build…I'm, I'm telling ya…we're looking to revitalize the area by building an elegant 
hotel. 
 
Samples from the Seller agents:  
 
Ok, let’s get this over with.  My client would be willing to accept a $25million (plus 2mm for the mortgage), 
plus a reserved suite or rental or whatever it is you are doing for himself. 
Understood.  To confirm, we'll go with 19.6, all cash, with your client having approval over any construction 
plans executed during 24 months.  I think we have a deal!  Sound good? 
 
For $35 million you can turn the houses into bordellos if you like. 
  
EXAMPLES OF SELF-REPORTED MISBEHAVIOR, EXPERIMENT 1 
Examples of ethical misbehavior, self-reported (Experiment 1) in response to the question:  
At any time during the negotiation, did you behave in a way that could be considered questionable 
from an ethical point of view? 
If so, what specifically did you do? 
• I lied. 
• When asked if I would demolish the building - I said no.  But we were - all but the front of the 
buildings. 
• I implied the purpose and tried to make it "appear" that it was residential. I used the word "reside" 
instead of "lodge.“ 
• Made evasive or misleading statements, but didn’t agree to anything I knew was explicitly untrue. 
• Yes - agreed to sign a "guarantee" that wouldn’t develop property in a way they didn’t want (high 
rise). 
